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Introductory overview
Ideas about "civil society" have figured intermittently in recent
left-wing debates about the future of South African society and
politics. Usually understood as some variant of "the associational life
of a society," distinct from and often opposed to "the state," in these
debates civil society has been discussed as a bulwark against
illegitimate state power, as a location for democratic politics and as a
basis for democratic strategizing.* This paper evaluates assumptions
underlying those discussions against the history of "civil society" as
an idea, and against the historical development of South African civil
society.
In social theory (primarily European and North American), the term
"civil society" has shifted meanings over time, responding to shifts in
social and political structures caused by the spread of capitalist
markets and industrial production. Early modern ideas of civil society
included the state within civil society. Nineteenth and twentieth
century thinkers reshaped those ideas to understand civil society as
separate from the state or in opposition to it.2 This newer conception
emerged as industrial political economies disrupted what I will refer to
as "the domestic realm" (an abstraction parallel to "the state" and
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"civil society"): domestic and personalistic social ties articulated in
kinship idioms, to which civil society including the state had
previously been opposed.3 ., _,[
South Africa'Ira's "al'so'experienced disruption of its domestic
realms (indigenous and,imporrte.d]uover the past century, but its patterns
of disruption of kinjidiam r.eia,ti'ons differ from European patterns. To
Ob biiK- iiv.c,") .^o
the extent that South African-jStEjUctural transformations have resembled
Iblv.to v.tj:7.:ri:iuo
those in Europe, the changesshawe not gone as far. Recent European
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concepts of civil society assume the destruction of any autonomous
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domestic realm. Therefore they may be inadequate to describe South
SMttO.SS. ,O.I'JGJ. L
African society, and may disguise key issues about democracy and social
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transformation. Moreover, South Africa's location in the geography and
ue-s'aei.-jjj .I-.XJ f
history of capitalist dsv"e'l'o:pmen8 mean that prior European social
.£ ,(3Eex
transformations to some extent preclude South Africa from developing
Pi'Ji .Mbeess.i.'i ''
along exactly the same path. Over-reliance on European analogies may
,!;&5t'?.;;c«. . C .\.~
lead to unintended 'urfdemo'e'Maei'eM'consequences on the one hand, and may
obscure democratic ^ Sssi-ei-l-i;&ire's "derived from the different historical
placement of South!&8ri:eaW--dWi*o~cr'atic struggles on the other.4
Apart from tHe .qu'es6'£6K.;o.£Kthe continued strength of the kin-idiom
. (88(:1 ,fiyj-jo!i
domestic realm vis-a-vis the public realm of states and markets, more
conventionally conce-i?ved)is1fafe'J?civil society relations in South Africa
are historically diist'in'c~t?fvW3'Th"e most usual analogies, to Leninist
states in eastern Eu:rbpeT,°''aftcV't:b 'state-society relations elsewhere in
Africa, are substant!iiriy)'#£sfftading. In both Eastern Europe and
Africa, civil society is seen as having been weak or non-existent.
South Africa, to the contrary, has had a robust civil society with deep
historical roots. Unfortunately, South Africa's civil society is also
one which has been deeply shaped in undemocratic ways by systematic,
deliberate racial and class oppression. Although organized by the
state, much of the political impetus for that oppression has emanated
from civil society. That democrats have recently created spaces and
means for successful struggle within civil society 3hould not blind us
to this longer history. Civil society has been a terrain of anti-
democratic as well as democratic struggle in South Africa.5
South Africa's history of colonial state-formation,
segregationism, and apartheid state-practices has shaped civil society
undemocratically. Also, all of the major frameworks for interpreting
South African history imply that apartheid and its antecedents were
responses to political pressures emanating from civil society. The
debates can be re-read as being about which segment of civil society to
emphasize as most important (e.g. racialized religious ideology,
capitalism and its agents, racialist white workers and farmers), and
over the significance of African agency in class- and community-
formation and in politics necessarily pursued outside of the state.
Left-democratic theorists have focused on popular resistance based
in civil society as a possible model for post-apartheid democratic
politics,6 or on civil society as an antidote to one-party-statist
tendencies within liberation movements.7 When considering civil
society, they have paid less attention to white-owned and controlled
property and corporations, and to other forms of white associational
life.8 Yet the idea of civil society would easily frame an analysis of
white South Africans as members of chambers of commerce and industry,
trade unions, farmers unions, churqhes, the Broederbond, and other
voluntary associations, as property owners and market participants, and
as beneficiaries of apartheid privileges.
More broadly, I think that the historical politics of
colonization, segregation and apartheid can be rethought fruitfully in
terms of white-dominated and organized sectors of civil society
controlling the state and using it to force Africans and other black
people into civil society on subordinate terms, and later to restrict
their incorporation into civil society.9 The historical centrality in
white discourses of the idea that Africans required to be "civilized" by
whites illustrates the need for such analysis. I also believe that
making such an analysis exposes issues for democratic strategizing about
civil society now.
To avoid undemocratic and anti-democratic pitfalls, and to best
use the idea of civil society in strategizing for democratic
development, it may help to have a specific, historically-grounded
conception of South African civil society as a terrain of struggle.
Using such a conception we should consider the genealogical ties of late
twentieth-century discourses of civil society to ideas about
civilization and modernization which legitimated and sustained
colonialism, segregation and apartheid. We should recognize that in
capitalist societies, language defending civil society has sometimes
given cover to the undemocratic and anti-democratic potentialities in
capitalism, and identify such uses in South African politics. Most
crucially, we should develop understanding about the ways in which, far
from being opposed, forces in the state and civil society have
frequently co-operated to attack the autonomy of the domestic realm in
colonized communities. This history has led to uneven forms and degrees
of incorporation of African, Coloured and Indian individuals and
communities (and to a lesser extent, of white working-class individuals
and communities) into either state or civil society.10
To the extent that an uneven pattern of incorporation persists,
democratic strategies which focus on mobilization within civil society
may fail to include many persons, and may even create new barriers to
their democratic participation. Categories of persons for whom less
than full incorporation might lead to continued exclusion include (but
should not be prematurely limited to) rural dwellers on both state-
organized "traditional" tenure lands and privately-owned farms;
residents of self-built urban areas with limited infrastructure and
insecure residency and tenure rights ("squatter communities"); migrant
workers and hostel-dwellers; women; children; the unemployed; and
unorganized workers. (Obviously many of these categories overlap.)11
At this point we should turn to historical analysis. A double
analysis is offered. The first part sketches the development and shifts
of meaning of the concept of "civil society" in European contexts. The
second part retraces modern South African history through the lens of
"civil society" and its relationship to an autonomous "domestic realm."
History and f.hft idfia of p.ivil. .society
Four modern senses of "civil society" have relevance to this
discussion. The oldest defines civil society as the realm of secular
state authority and power, in distinction from ecclesiastical authority
and power, a distinction which took on heightened significance from
early modern European religious conflicts. A slightly later-emerging
usage treats civil society a3 a realm of civility, urbanity, and
urbanness, constituted by political relations of law and market
relations of (law-supported) contract, in opposition to rural,
personalistic, kin-oriented society. Here civil society, as the realm
of political economy, appears as the realm of progress and
"civilization," over against patriarchal households, barbarism, and
rustic cultural isolation. With the writings of G.W. Hegel, the idea of
civil society as a realm of public relationships distinct from the state
first emerged clearly, preeminently as the realm of voluntary market
relationships and commerce. Antonio Gramsci re-emphasized politics,
seeing civil society as a realm of popular association or organization
outside of the state in a narrow sense, in which consent (and less
frequently, opposition) to class rule was organized. Groups susceptible
to political mobilization include political parties civic groups,
religious bodies and trade unions among other groups. The last of these
senses has been most prominent in South African democracy debates, but
the other senses retain relevance both to efforts to build popular
democracy, and efforts to restrain it.
The earlier senses of civil society included the state and
markets, both implicitly and explicitly. Christian religious war3 of
the put the question of state religions and the political status of non-
orthodox believers into the heart of politics.12 The modern association
of ideas about civil society with questions of freedom of conscience and
association (civil liberties) and with partial or full citizenship
(civil rights) dates from this period.13 In this context, the idea of
"civility" is clo3ely associated with the state. In South Africa today,
debates over the rule of law, the constitutional limitation of state
power, and how to define the terrain on which conflicts among rights and
liberties will be resolved (e.g. the right to hold and control the use
of private property vs. rights to socially provided goods S services, or
vs. the right to organize trade unions), should be seen as part of the
problem of reconstructing civil society.
The second sense of civil society linked state, law and markets,
and opposed them to kin- and community-idiom rural social relations, not
only in theory but in practice. This sense of civil society was most
prevalent in the period in western Europe of the legal destruction of
feudal, tributary and communal relationships. In this period, the
destruction of communal and customary rights to land and other means of
subsistence, and the expansion of civil legislation which superceded
common or customary law, depended not on the opposition of state and
markets, but their collaboration. It lent the idea of civil society a
class dimension: civil society appeared coterminous with bourgeois
society.14 In many respects processes analogous to these are not yet
complete in South Africa. The question of whether they ought to be
"completed" is already implicitly shaping democracy debates (especially
in the areas of land rights and rural law and governance), which perhaps
would benefit from explicitly framing what's at stake in these terms.
The early modern opposition of civil society to domestic society
rather than to the state, and its relationship to the social
transformations of capitalist construction were also reflected in the
emergence of the term "political economy." "Economy" derives from the
Greek words "oikos," household, and "nomos," law or custom. Economy
originally referred to the proper ordering of the household, seen as
private, domestic and kin-oriented, not political, and in fact as
defining the boundary of the political. In societies where most
production went on in kin-organized households, and a good deal of
commerce involved artisan enterprises tied to such households, such a
concept of economy was fairly serviceable. But by the 18th century in
England, enough of what we would today call "economic" activity went on
independently of households and kinship, or in market relations between
households, that it required a new designation. The chosen oxymoron
"political economy" shows that public commercial and productive activity
was conceived of in close relationship to the state, which created the
institutional forms of its corporate existence and enforced its
contracts. There is a close parallel between the constructions
"political economy" and "civil society."15
Hegel's Philosophy of Rip-ht-. marked a key transition in ideas of
civil society. Hegel used terms translated into English as "civil
society" for that part of the public life taking place outside of the
state. Yet he also retained a tri-partite division, recognizing the
domestic realm (now reduced to "the family") as distinct from civil
society and from the state. For Hegel, family, civil society and state
comprised three ethical moments in dialectical and hierarchical
relationship to each other. Civil society was superior to the family
(indirectly marking the unfolding victory of market over kinship tie3),
and the state was superior to both, where the superior moments both
transcended and incorporated the inferior ones. Hegel saw the state as
a moral culmination which brought family and civil society to full
fruition, expressing universal interests rather than particular ones,
thereby embodying the ethical unity of society.16
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Subsequent developments of the idea of civil society depart from
Hegel, sharing his separation of civil society from the state, but
rejecting his portrayal of the state as superior and universal. Liberal
ideas of civil society retained Hegel's focus on market relations as
| characterizing civil society, but combined them with older ideas about
rights and liberties, particularly as they restrain state intervention
i
I in markets beyond guaranteeing the institutional conditions of market
relations. Where Hegel saw the state as perfecting civil society,
! liberalism sees the state as necessary but threatening to civil society,
the realm of freedom to pursue happiness.17
j Marxist ideas, on the other hand, especially as developed by
Antonio Gramsci, have retained Hegel's focus on the 3tate as the end of
j politics, and his critique of civil society's property-ba3ed
particularism as ethically deficient. But Marxist ideas have treated
the state as partial rather than universal, embodying narrow class
interests. Thinkers influenced by Gfamsci have conceived of civil
society as a realm of contestation in which political forces expressing
class and other social interests [manoeuver] to preserve or gain state
power, and to legitimate or contest the legitimacy of existing social
relations.18
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History of Civil Rnripty in SA i
I will now turn to an overview of South African civil society in
the last two centuries. Much recent historiography has focused on
political economy, labor and political mobilization. The narrative here
will seem familiar, since the markets, associational life and the
supporting political/juridical state institutions which constitute civil
society, and the re-organization of rural production away from kin- and
household-based relationships, underpinning colonial state-formation and
civil-society formation, are prominent in existing accounts. At the
same time, a focus on civil society puts the pieces together with
different emphases, which I hope may make aspects of the strategic
terrain of politics more visible than they have been. This historical
approach is oriented to the undemocratic features of South African civil
society as it developed historically. Who was included and excluded?
What have strategies of hegemony been, and what might they be?
In terms of relationships between the domestic realm, civil
society, and the state, the history of southern Africa over the last two
centuries can be divided into four broad phases, with the present period
being the beginning of the fifth. In the early nineteenth century, most
southern African societies were politically dominated by relatively weak
states, but were primarily organized through relationships rooted in the
domestic realm. Civil society, in the sense of non-domestic, non-state
state relationships, was weakly instituted and occupied a limited social
space.19 (The small colonial society at the Cape had a somewhat more
extensive civil realm, but expanding it caused wide social conflict even
among the settler population.)20
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The second phase corresponded to the process of colonization,
which can be seen in part as one of colonial state-formation and civil-
society formation. In this period, colonialists sought to subordinate
African states politically and to incorporate Africans into colonial
civil societies on subordinate terms benificial to colonists. These
efforts met with only partial succe33, as Africans were able to raise
substantial resistance from a social base in indigenous domestic-realm
insitutions, both by carving out realms of relative autonomy from
colonial society, and by- forcing compromises and taking substantial
initiatives in defining the terms on which they did enter.21 In this
phase, colonial efforts to conquer, "civilize" and domesticate Africans
entailed widespread co-operation between the forces of the colonial
states and those of colonial civil societies to break the power and
relationships of African domestic realms.22 A small number of Africans
were forced or chose to enter into deeper engagements with colonial
civil society than the vast majority did; their experiences and actions
created a template which shaped the terms of subsequent wider African
civil incorporation.23
The third phase was that of the consolidation of colonial state
power and strengthening of colonial civil society based on mining-driven
economic development, and of the hegemony of segregationist ideas. In
this phase the last independent African polities were conquered and
several of the colonial polities in the region were unified into a
single more powerful state. The combined pressures of state and market
forces working to expropriate the land base of African societies, to
disrupt the African domestic realm and to force Africans into colonial
civil gained widening effectiveness; but to the chagrin of colonialists.
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Africans entering colonial society still sought to do so on their own
terms, with considerable success.24 As the potential for incorporated
Africans to demand full civil rights and liberties and full political
rights became apparent, the central aim of the colonialist project
regarding the relationship between colonial civil society and the
African domestic realm shifted away from disruption.
A new strategy emerged of seeking to shore up a reconstituted and
subordinate African domestic realm, on the margins of civil society, in
Native reserves; to restrict African capacity to create autonomous
domestic relations outside the reserves; and to incorporate Africans on
white-owned farms more thoroughly under the domestic power of white
land-owners. The strategy turned on tying farm labor to the land,
institutionalizing oscillating labor migration from the reserves more
systematically, and restricting permanent urban settlement and family-
formation, thus limiting and controlling African participation in civil
society.25 But this strategy ran counter to the long-term dynamics of
the underlying political economy, as contradictions between the
interests of different sections of white civil society and the overall
requirements of capitalist expansion prevented Africans from retaining
sufficient resources to sustain an autonomous reconstituted African
domestic realm. African urbanization and the elaboration of urban-rural
ties among Africans continued, and Africans expanded the size and
variety of their market involvements and associational life, including
the growth of associations devoted to political advocacy.26
The fourth phase corresponds to the era of "grand apartheid,"
beginning in the 1950s, seen as a response to the failure of post-1948
attempts to restore segregationism following its partial breakdown under
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Second World War economic mobilization. In this phase tensions between
state and civil society became much more pronounced than in previous
periods, in two ways. On the one hand, African civil society continued
to expand and to mobilize politically on a more extensive mass basis,
throwing up a fundamental challenge to hegemonic strategies based on a
predominantly white civil society. On the other hand, the expansion of
manufacturing, commercial and financial capital, relative to mining and
agricultural capital,, led to conflicts from within those sectors with
the hegemonic strategy of segregationism, based on mining and
agricultural interests. The new strategy, instead of simply restricting
the growth of African civil society and attendant political claims and
ambitions, sought to displace them through an ersatz de-colonization
into pseudo-states based on the old reserves, and through physical
displacement of both industrial production and African residence, to
areas close to reserves, and into them, respactively. The need to
displace rather than simply prevent African urbanization was intensified
by mechanization of agriculture leading to massive evictions of rural
Africans from white-owned land, which, combined with internal population
growth and intensified application of pass laws, concentrated African
population in the reserves, ending their proximity to agricultural self-
sufficiency.27
The history of segregationist and apartheid strategies raises an
important aspect of the question of hegemony. After an extended period
of conflict leading to the British conquest of the Boer republics and
formation of the Union, the Hertzogian and Malanite National Parties
were able to organize a successful historical bloc on basis of white
sectors of civil society, while African and other black sectors of civil
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society remained weak. The hegemony of that historical bloc, which
operated in the interests of the development of capitalism generally,
and of Afrikaner capitalists and white workers in the inner politics of
the bloc, had two dimensions.28 There was a strong hegemony involving
active consent to the political order, and a weak hegemony involving the
capacity to exclude certain challenges from public life, under which
people acquiesced and went on with their lives. The strong hegemony
encompassed the vast bulk of the white population; the weak hegemony
affected those excluded from the political order. The latter declined
in effectiveness after the Second World War. As it crumbled, state
capacity to exclude challenges collapsed, which undermined the strong
sectional hegemony among whites.
Thus apartheid strategy, and the longer-term hegemony of
segregationist-nationalist ideologies rooted in white sectors of civil
society, entered a crisis in the 1970s, which intensified in the
1980s.29 Again the crisis was two-sided. On the one hand, African
civil society continued to expand, as did the organizing capacities of
the African population. Both the strategy itself, and the needs of
industry required expanded literacy and technical skills. At the same
time the strategy was intensely oppressive to black communities,
expanding grievances along with organizing capacities. In the 19703 and
1980s black communities rapidly developed a multi-dimensional
politicized associational life, including trade unions, residence-based
"civic" organizations, student and youth movements, and religious
organizations, which challenged the inequities of the social order. At
the same time, the shape of white civil society changed dramatically.
Rural, farming and farm-dependent communities shrank as a proportion of
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the white population (although retaining disproportionate electoral
influence), and while many of the newly urbanized worked for the state
or state-owned enterprises, an increasing proportion worked for private
non-minig corporations, even as Afrikaan3-speaking whites began making
inroads into business ownership and high-level corporate management.
Thus a substantial section of the ruling National Party's electoral base
was tied to sections of capital which had an interest in resolving the
political crisis and international isolation, although they also
benefitted from racial discrimination which was bound to erode in
accommodating to African civil society. Efforts to reform apartheid by
creating more space for an African civil society composed of legally
demarcated "urban insiders," and by extending the focus of hegemonic
efforts to Indian and Coloured communities split the NP.30
Those reform efforts only intensified the crisis of apartheid
strategy, leading to a dual policy of repression against protest rooted
in black civil society, and dismantling of apartheid practices. In my
view, the political resolution of the crisis derived from a convergence
of forces from both sections of civil society which were in conflict or
tension with the state. Specifically, the inability of the state to
completely ban COSATU in 1988 was based on the centrality of the unions
to the developing industrial relations system. Corporate interests
insisted that state efforts to restrict the unions' political activities
not take the form of preventing them from acting at all. COSATU used
the resulting space to take a leading role in organizing the Mass
Democratic Movement, and the state'3 capitulation to the demands of
hunger-striking detainees early in 198 9 broke the back of the repressive
option. While the organized and mobilized forces of black sections of
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civil society drove the whole process, the fact that their political
space to act depended in part on the unions being perceived as necessary
to key corporate interests i3 crucial for thinking about the politics of
civil society and democracy in the emerging new phase.31
In this next phase, the central process will be integrating
previously extruded sections of civil society into the social order as a
whole, and in relation to the state, but the question remains, which
sections and on what basis? In my view, the answer to that question
will shape the character of democratization. As I will argue further
below, I believe that the insider/outsider reform strategy promoted on a
basis of formal political-bureaucratic demarcation and enforcement by
the NP of the late 1970s and early 1980s represented substantial
interests in civil society, and that its political failure wa3 based
mainly on the unacceptable visibility of the enforcement mechanisms,
which formed part of the larger hegemonic crisis of apartheid.
Now that the old illegitimate political order has been removed, a
real possibility exists that an alliance of social forces which became
divided by the legitimacy problems will re-emerge to promote the
reconsititution of insider/outsider reform strategies. This version
would be organized through state-supported market mechanisms, rather
than directly by the state. Such a strategy would be legitimated by the
electoral form of democracy, but limit the social substance of it. The
outcome of struggles over such efforts will depend on the outcome of
constitutional struggles over scope and shape of state power. The
allocation of rights between different sectors of civil society,
particularly as between state support of popular rights to organize and
press demands, and state support of private and corporate exemptions
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from restriction on the use of property and the organization of "private
sector" production, will define the terrain of politics.
Limits of "civil society" riehatas in South Africa
This historical context exposes certain Iimit3 of uses of the idea
of "civil society" in recent left-wing political discourse in South
Africa. The idea has formed part of intellectual criticism of Stalinism
and its legacies on the South African left, influencing debates over the
possibility and conditions of democratic socialism or participatory
social democracy, and over the nature and requirements of democracy..
The first round of these debates took place during the crises of East
European socialism and of apartheid, at the height of the influence of
trade-union led Mass Democratic Movement. The terrain of debate has now
shifted. Multi-party negotiations for an interim constitution, the
conditions of a government of national unity, and attendant political
compromises in the interests of a stable transition and of national
reconciliation seem in many ways to define fairly limited social
democratic projects as the horizon of left-wing aspiration for the near
term. In this context the question of civil society and democracy needs
to be revisited.
Some of the earlier debates about "civil society" defined the
central problem of the left and the central obstacle to democracy in
South Africa as the spectre of a totalizing party-3tate, given the
history of such states in central and eastern Europe, and the history of
African nationalist one-party states elsewhere in Africa.32 These are
crucial issues, but they form an insufficient frame for considering the
relevance of "civil society" for democracy in South Africa. Both the
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east European model and the African model are in different ways
misleading. In each of those models, civil society has been 3een as
weak or non-existent. In eastern Europe, old forms of•civil society
were repressed by communist states. The relative effectiveness of that
repression, and the thoroughgoing ambitions of communist states for
control of society, has led to definitions of "civil society" along
lines of "everything outside the state." While some South African
thinkers adopt such a view, others have raised questions about it.33
Those questions need to be pursued further.
In Africa, the situation appears differently. Civil society is
seen as weak because in effect it has not come fully into existence.
Large parts of African populations, particularly peasants, are seen as
only tenuously tied into national states and markets, posing severe
problems of legitimacy which one-party or military states have
frequently sought to resolve by coercion. The African situation differs
from the east European one in that society is strong relative to the
state. However, society lacks in "civilness," i.e. integration with
national, urban-centered political and economic institutions (especially
states and formal markets).34 In such a situation, "civil society"
cannot be understood as everything outside the state. There are social
relationships which are not only outside of the state, but of civil
society as well. Such a conception accords better with historical usage
of the term in 17th and 18th century Europe than does the east European
conception. It is also necessary for thinking about civil society in
South Africa.35
South Africa differs from both eastern Europe and many other parts
of Africa, because of its existing, powerful civil society. However, as
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we have seen, South African civil society has been grossly and
undemocratically malformed by colonization, segregation and apartheid.
This malformation nonetheless differs from the totalizing repression by
European communist states. In this circumstance, the democratic left in
South Africa faces a double problem. On the one hand, it faces
struggles against undemocratic models of totalizing socialist states.
But on the other hand, it must resist efforts to lock in existing
racialized, class differentiated and undemocratic forms of civil society
by constituting a new state too weak to reshape the civil society
produced by South Africa's history.36 Many of the conceptions of civil
society visible in published debates cannot sustain an adequate response
to the second challenge. Consistent attention must be paid to a lesson
which South Africa's own history teaches: ft strong civil society may be
a prerequisite for democracy, but there is nothing inherently democratic
about civil society.
Likewise the model of post-colonial nationalist governments
elsewhere in Africa contains several warnings for South African
democrats. Some of them are clearly understood.! The history of one-
party rule, suppression of trade-union autonomy, denial of rights of
political association and expression and related problems.of corruption
and oppression have been widely discussed. These are serious risks
which should not be minimized and deserve all the attention which they
have received.
The less recognized lesson from Africa for South Africa is that
most African nationalist states have been weak states, and that the
repressive practices of many African states has derived from their
weakness rather than their strength. It is now widely recognized that
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in most African countries, large parts of the population are not fully
engaged with the state or incorporated into the polity, and that for
many of those who are so engaged, the forms of engagement involve
partial, particularist relationships often discussed under rubrics like
patrimonialism, clientalism and corruption.37 In this situation,
whether described as strong societies with weak states, uncaptured
peasantries, or states lacking legitimacy, many persons do not see
themselves a3 responsible to the polity or the state. Conversely the
state is not responsible or accountable to most of its ostensible
citizens. The populace consequently is vulnerable to the depredations
and coercions of those controlling state structures and forces of
violence, who use them for narrowly sectional or private ends, or to
private power given free rein by corrupt or ineffective states. In
their narrowness, disconnection and illegitimacy 3uch states strikingly
resemble the colonial states whose forms, laws and often practices they
inherited.38
South Africa faces variants of these problems, particularly in the
former bantustana, although its more extensive industrialization,
internal market development and integration into world markets make them
somewhat different.' But the South African variants of these problems
are still substantially problems of building, extending or expanding
civil society. In particular, development of popular democracy will
require building the associational strength of popular sectors of civil
society, not only of mobilizing civil society for democracy. Such a
process i3 not unproblematic nor inherently democratic. The process of
building a democratic civil society in South Africa must also be a
process of reconstructing the powerful but undemocratic one already in
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existence. As the writings of activists in various social and political
reconstruction efforts show, together with recent news reports, that
process is extremely difficult. Efforts to build and reconstruct civil
society on democratic lines are beset on one side by problems of
reaching people on the basis of limited resources, and on the other side
by pressures from the center to compromise at the grass-roots for the
sake of "stability," "investor confidence," and so on.39
Marginalization of the Domestic: Realm
In my view, many of the central problems of organizing to sustain
substantial and accountable democracy lie among groups and categories
who have been marginalized from civil society and the state by the
historical processes weakening and reshaping the social relations of the
domestic realm. Political analysis of those problems follows below.
Here I want to address certain aspects of the historical raarginalization
of African domestic realms in slightly more detail.
One dimension of the marginalization of African domestic realms
reflects the historical subordination of the indigenous political-
judicial authorities which organized pre-colonial societies. The
subordination of indigenous authorities was a dual process of
domestication and bureaucratization. Following military conquest, the
character of African political subordination was gradually transformed
from a tributary relationship, in which African leaders organized
community payment of money or labor to colonial states, into a
bureaucratic one, in which chiefs and headmen became state
functionaries, while the state sought to co-opt the inherited legitimacy
of their positions. This reconstruction of indigenous offices, which
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reduced their popular accountability while increasing their .
accountability to the state, was tied ideologically to efforts at the
reconstruction of patriarchal power within households. An emergent
crisis of authority for both chiefs and homestead heads was ascribed not
to colonial intervention in the material basis of domestic life, but
rather to the decline of traditional values and the ostensible moral
• decay of women and youth out of control. This rhetorical and
ideological strategy, by linking chiefs' and fathers' claims to
authority based on tradition, represented a domestication of the
legitimacy of chiefs, many of whose pre-colonial legitimating functions
had been usurped by the state, or turned to state benefit over that of
rural communities. In the segregation era, chiefs found themselves torn
between the pressures of state incorporation (and the self-serving
opportunities it sometimes opened) and other pressures rooted in rural
households and communities on the defensive.40
A second dimension of marginalization can be seen if the effects
of incorporation into civil society and state on African households and
kin-groups. African tenants on white-owned farms often found themselves
in domestic isolation from chiefs. While peasant strategies based on
rental and share-cropping remained possible, some tenants preferred such
isolation. But as conditions of tenancy changed, through state
intervention and technological and market development, tenant
communities became increasingly vulnerable.41 In the reserves,
crowding, state intervention through "betterment" and related schemes,
and the emergence of highly institutionalized migrant labor changed the
significance of land access to rural survival strategies. Chiefs'
control of land access both heightened the importance of rural
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clientalism, and intensified the tensions within such relationships.
Landlessness began to affect significant numbers of people (especially
women), and competition for land led to the emergence of quasi-
landlordism on the part of chiefs in some area3, who could make
exactions which began to resemble rents.42
Apartheid strategy intensified these marginalization processes.
Traditional leader roles became increasingly separated from their roots
in the domestic realm, and increasingly attached to bantustan state
structures, as many chiefs and their allies pursued accumulation through
positions in bureaucracies and parastatal development companies.
Apartheid efforts to build the bantustans as alternative states and
civil societies created new forms of land-use, tenure, property-holding,
and rent-seeking. Sections of the population began to derive their
incomes from civil service and teacher jobs. Although they were the
focus of intense debate and struggle within both the central state and
the bantustan states, policies involving deliberate class-formation and
differentiation strategies through administered differentiation of land
access were widely discussed and increasingly practiced from the 1950s
on (if not earlier). Such policies, and the crowding, land competition
and land-use practices which gave rise to them were intensified by
evictions and forced removals from white-owned land and "black spots" in
the 1960s and 1970s."
The forced removals and "influx control" policies of the apartheid
era created patterns of wide geographical separation of residence from
employment. They restricted the freedom women and children to live in
towns, and created what amount to a massive assault on African family
structures. Although apartheid is often compared with justice to the
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worst forms of totalitarian oppression in its effects on people, in fact
its assault on the domestic realm represented a highly unusual form of
oppression. Apartheid inverted more typical authoritarian practices,
X
which usually have aimed at repressing political activity by
encapsulating people in private relationships, and linking state
stability and authority to familial stability and authority. Although
within the bantustans apartheid ideology tried to sustain a similar
linkage, apartheid's intervention in many people's capacity to Sustain
any sort of predictable family life represented a unique form of
oppression, and a source of illegitimacy impossible to overcome.44 It
also created a large population of marginalized and vulnerable people.
Margins of South African Civil Bnc.-i at-y45
A good place to begin looking for people on the margins of civil
society, who are at risk of exclusion from any civil society-based
democratic politics, is in places labelled "informal." Communities
living in self-built informal housing are a crucial example. Such
communities, often forming huge settlements, have urban population
densities, but lack the infrastructure of cities. Some of them form
parts of existing metropolitan areas; others were isolated from them by
apartheid in what has been labelled "displaced urbanization." Many such
communities are informal in the sense that they lack municipal 3tatus or
well-defined incorporation into a larger municipality. Their "informal"
character may be marked by many features obstructing civil order and the
provision of civic services, for example, lack of control of
construction in the name of safety and public health, lack of organized
streets with a numbering system, and so on.
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Lack of regular access to basic amenities in turn supports the
development of clientalist politics baaed on the control of resources
like building sites or water taps, and on the threat of loss of access.
While such politics, based on personalistic ties, are not a3
specifically tied to kinship ideas as hereditary chiefship, it is
notable that kin-idioms, particularly related to fatherhood, have
characterized prominent examples of clientalist politics in "informal"
settlements.46
Such communities face profound difficulty in constructing and
maintaining institutions which can hold local leaders or representatives
accountable. The alternative of turning to formally constituted
authorities was largely impossible under apartheid. In theory, such
approaches should become possible under the new dispensation, but they
bring new difficulties. "Informal" communities may also have difficulty-
holding formal political bodies accountable to them, by definition. An
approach to an external body, whether it be a municipality, a
bureaucracy tied to a regional or national government department, or a
national NGO or negotiating forum, must in itself be an act of
representation, raising the question again of which persons have
standing to represent the community.41
The other obvious and important place where the idea of
informality comes in is that of "informal sector" employment and
entrepreneurship. The informal sector in essence encompasses market
relations occurring outside the ambit of government regulation, enacted
by persons not U3ing government defined and enforced organizational
forms to carry out commerce. From certain points of view, the informal
sector appears to be civil society in its purest form, involving
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voluntary association and commerce with a minimum of state regulation.48
Yet this low state presence has ambiguous consequences.
The "civility" of unregulated civil society can easily come
unglued when market competition appears to participants to threaten
their livelihoods, or when some participants pursue monopolistic
strategies to their ruthless conclusions, as South Africa's "taxi wars"
illustrate. While states in Africa, faced with large and growing
populations of people lacking formal employment, increasingly look to
the "informal sector" to provide people with income to subsist, such
strategies potentially remove large areas of economic activity from
taxation, despite their reliance on state-produced structures. They may
also undermine the legitimacy of the political and social order, which
appears unable to guarantee conditions of basic security. Moreover,
lack of regulation exposes people to a variety of abuses, including
exploitative wages, denial of rights to organize unions, purchase of
shoddy or dangerous products, fraud, protection rackets and the like.
These risks exemplify a broader pattern of extra-economic and
economic private coercions, often linked to the personalistic control of
space and spatial access to limited resources discussed above, which
obsessive hostility to state power obscures. The informal sector is not
only relatively free from state intervention, but marginal to aspects of
state power and civil order which help to improve the security and
quality of life. While the civility of civil society depends in part on
its ability to restrain illegitimate state power, it also depends on its
capacity to mobilize state power against illegitimate, unjust and
undemocratic private power.
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Other forms of marginality to civil society are produced by the
structures of governance in the former bantustana, created by a
contorted amalgamation of elements of the old domestic realm with
unaccountable bureaucratic structures dependent on funding from the
central state. "Traditional leaders" and new civil servants (some
related by kinship to the older elites) exercise personalistic control
of access to resources. Those who gain access are at the mercy of power
which they cannot hold accountable, but they also gain something to
lose, which some seek to defend if it appears threatened. Others, cut
out, are desperate for survival and often lack resources to sustain
organized struggle. Shortages of land and other collective resources
for distribution through community and state mechanisms are exacerbated
by partial, class-biased appropriation in favor of individuals or state
and parastatal enterprises controlled by a few. In these circumstances
many rural families, composed disproportionately of women, children and
the elderly, depend on remittances from relatives in urban areas,
pension incomes controlled by bureaucrats and the like.
The politics of civil society in the former bantustans has been
shaped by the unevenness of access to resources. Generally speaking,
those able to mobilize have included chiefs and others tied to
structures of "traditional leadership," (including bantustan political
movements, which sometimes had youth wing3), conservative businessmen,
often closely allied with conservative chiefs and bantustan officials,
youth and students (who have been the most likely to be linked to
national opposition organizations), and civil servants. Other
organizations (including churches, stokvels, and burial societies, but
also outposts of many NGO efforts) tend to be localized and often not
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politically oriented. This leaves very many people largely unorganized,
especially in a political sense.49
For much of the. 1980s patterns of conflict emerged which pitted
youth and students against chiefs, officials and vigilantes. Some
chiefs and many civil servants were sympathetic to national anti-
apartheid movements. Many more proved open to pressure to come over and
support the movements, and from the late 1980s the ANC increasingly
pursued a strategy of using local pressure against banstu3tan heads to
influence their actions in national level negotiations. Yet this
strategy has ambiguous consequences for the very local ANC supporters
mobilized to bring the pressure, since the national organization must
seek to accommodate at the national level those with whom they have had
conflicts over local issues. Its meaning for those not effectively
organized or mobilized is even less clear, though probably worse.
Another key category of persons marginal to civil society is
migrant workers and hostel dwellers, who come increasingly into
competition and conflict with residents of surrounding communities,
often members of "informal settlements". Although violence involving
hostel dwellers in recent years has often been interpreted in terms of
ethnic mobilization, it is notable that at least one line of response
has aimed at dismantling the hostels. At least some hostel dwellers
view such proposals as a threat to a way of life and economic strategy
which allows them to maintain contact which they desire with rural areas
(although others have moved families into hostels). If the system of
migrant labor and its institutions developed out of partial disruption
of the rural African domestic realm, it is not clear that best
democratic way forward is simply to complete the job. Rather, as
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negotiations have to some extent recognized, the situation exemplifies
an area where democracy can be advanced by organizing marginal people so
they could represent themselves and negotiate in their own interests.50
Yet it also exemplifies an area in which the interests of different
popular sectors of civil society conflict.
Many of the categories listed above (most of which have a spatial
base) tend to overlap with other categories of marginality defined by
distance from central institutions, such as unemployed workers,
unorganized workers, or school-leaving youth.
It is not an accident that much of the violence of recent years
was both mobilized among these marginalized groups, and targetted them.
We should recognize that violent conservative movements are based in
civil society, both in market and property relationships which people
fear losing or from which they seek to gain coercively or politically,
and in the associational life of vigilante gangs, parties, cultural
•organizations and so on. In many cases the people mobilized feel
excluded from organized "progressive" groups, alarmed by them, and
worried that they threaten resources, social ties and lifeways important
to them. Often these ties are rooted in the truncated domestic realm,
or in mythic images of what it ostensibly once was. Conversely, efforts
at civic, youth and student organizing have sometimes been turned
violently to locally opportunistic and undemocratic ends, lending
ideological cover to criminal activities; or have exercised coercive
political power in a manner not accountable to communities.
Finally it should be observed that gender give3 structure to
marginalization in South Africa in two ways. One is that many of the
marginal categories described above are composed disproportionately of
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women and of others who depend on women in various ways. The other is
that within all groups, whether well or poorly integrated with civil
society and the state, women and concerns or interests of heightened
importance to them tend to be pushed to the margins.51 Both of these
forms of marginalization derive substantially from the violent
dismemberment and reconstruction of domestic realms. The historical
invisibility of that process contributes to a current problem identified
in a recent discussion of criteria for a reconstruction programme:
[I]ndividual3 operate in society from the base of the
family. The reconstruction programme focuses on the three
key locations of power: state, economy and civil society.
But unless we recognize the family as being a key site of
power we will not be able to successfully address gender
issues.52
What these groups have in common is that they are made up of
people who depend on civil society and the state for survival, but who
have diffficulty making the institutions of either accountable to them.
In that situation, their best hope usually is to turn to clientage
strategies, which increases the importance of personalistic politics.
The results can often be deeply exploitive. Yet attempts to formalize
informal relationships and to regulate the strategies which marginalized
people pursue can cut them off from meager existing resources without
offering any substitute. Thorough, expansive democracy above all needs
to enable the marginalized to make known what they fear losing, that may
be hidden to the eyes of those better-integrated to civil society, or
misintrepeted by them. This suggests that democratic strategy should
aim to build organizations and capacity to hold the powerful accountable
first, before taking down what exists.53
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C.nnnT n a 4 fin
South African analyses of the democratic politics of civil society
which have focused on the idea itself have to large extent focused on
the desirability of restraining illegitimate 3tate power, again3t the
background of Eastern European and African cautionary tales. More
recently, writings on the practical politics of transition in areas
which might fall under the rubric of civil society have raised more
complex issues. Thi3 paper has tried to suggest a framework for
analyzing the democratic politics of South African civil society against
the history of that civil society, which has been characterized first by
an alliance of state and civil society against an African domestic
realm, and secondly by an alliance of the state with some sectors of
civil society, defined in both racial and class terms, against other
sectors.
The politics of transition have been characterized by newly
legalized popular parties establishing their relations in political
society with parties representing social interests longer represented in
the state, by focus on compromise and need to reassure big business, and
by attendant efforts to lower and in some cases discipline popular
expectations. A degree of tension between local organizations, on the
one hand, and national parties and structures which seek to represent
them has emerged.54 This pattern suggests that during the next period
of government of national unity, in which the constitutional terrain for
subsequent politics will be defined, the key issue for democracy may not
be that of restraint of state power. Rather it may be whether
conditions amenable to popular democracy will be established, in which
the state is open and responsive to popular sectors of civil society.
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There seema to be a live possibility that popular democracy will be
limited to formal representation, with the state remaining largely
closed to popular influence, while being open and responsive to
corporate and to a lesser extent to professional and perhaps corporate
unionist sectors.55
In these circumstances, the democratic politics of civil society
will not be so much a politics of civil society against illegitimate
state power. Instead, I would argue, they are emerging as a politics of
struggle over the shape of civil society and of its linkages to the
state. In particular, those struggles will be over capacities to
mobilize various sectors of civil society and mechanisms to make the
state responsive to them.56
The outcome of these struggles turns on the fate of communities
and sections of the population who for historical reasons remain
marginal to both civil society and state. If popular sectors of civil
society which are relatively well-organized and mobilized turn their
attention to securing 3hort-term interests and benefits during this
period, without increasing the organization and mobilization of
marginalized communities, the resultant bargaining is likely to produce
a pattern inimical to broad popular democracy on two levels. On one
level, it is likely to reproduce the marginality of the already
marginal, and re-intensify the insider-outsider problem.31 On another
level, it is likely to produce configurations of civil society and of
state-civil society linkages which limit the capacity of popular
organizations and movements to bring pressure to bear to advance or
defend their interests. In such a situation, popular organizations and
movements, including those relatively well-organized at present, would
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have difficulty holding the state accountable to them. Historically
enfranchised sectors of civil society, especially those tied to big
business, which will be strongly supported by international
corporations, financial bodies, and "western" governments, would tend to
predominate, with formal democracy and free markets forming the basis of
a new hegemony.
The difficulties of the current situation are apparent. Even
before the elections, local organizers in movements seeking to expand
the engagement of civil society were raising fears that national
umbrella organizations would become isolated from the grass-roots and
focused on the needs at the center of the now-ruling party. Before and
since the elections, some forms of pressure to de-mobilize civil society
(e.g. in efforts to gain no-strike pledges and threats to harshly
discipline civil servants who strike) have begun to emerge from the new
authorities. On the other hand, parliament is now controlled by a party
in which persons who have dedicated their lives to democratic
transformation have great influence. Presumably mere election to office
will not change that fact. Yet governments and governing parties must
mediate political pressures and disputes, so popular organizations and
movements must retain the ability to bring such pressures, and remind
parties which genuinely represent them who the parties' main
constituents are.
Desire for a stable transition is wise. Yet in the medium run, it
would seem that the interests of popular democracy will not be best
served by demobilizing civil society, but rather by extending
organization as much as i3 feasible to those on the margins. This will
be extremely difficult task, as organizations lose personnel to the
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government, and perhaps due to reluctance to challenge old comrades in
new positions. Moreover, organizations will have to confront questions
about partisanship in different forms, and about strategizing to get the
most out of allies in the stats without losing autonomy from the state.
In my view, the key issue in protecting the possibility of broad
democratic development is ensuring that the new government guarantees
favorable conditions for organizing popular movements, protected by the
new constitution and by law.
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is "uncivilized" is exactly the point of the previous section. The
concept of "civilization" used to justify colonialist attempts to
reconstruct African societies and culture is directly related to the
idea of civility underlying the idea of "civil society" and emerged
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"civil society," which required the subordination of kin-based ties
rooted in the domestic realm to new public spaces, institutions and
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Appendix: r.ivil ftQt-.ipt.y and State va. the Domestic*. Realm
in Lnrkp. Rnussfiau and Ferguson
I have suggested that early modern European thinkers treated civil
society as the public realm, including the state, understood in contrast
to the household or domestic society, and that this view has relevance
for understanding the history of South African civil society. This
appendix examines several early modern thinkers who include the state
within civil society, as distinguished from the private, domestic realm,
and whose ideas influenced ideologies of colonization and colonial
state-formation.1
John Locke's second treatise of government is titled "Of Civil-
Government," and Locke's purpose was to distinguish political or civil
government from "private dominion and personal jurisdiction" so "that
the power of magistrate may be distinguished from that of a father over
his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a
lord over his slave."2 Here Locke clearly distinguished civil and
domestic power, understanding civil power as state power. In chapter
VII of the treatise, titled "Of Political or Civil Society," Locke again
distinguished the domestic realm, encompassing society between man and
wife, parents and children, and society between master and servant, from
political or civil society. He saw these primordial domestic forms of
society as being still in the state of nature.3
For Locke, civil society was created by the formation of the
state. The realm of political authority was coterminous with civil
society and defined it, as society governed by law:
Those who are united into one body, and have a common established
law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide
controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil
society with one another: but those who have no such common
appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature...4
While Locke distinguished civil society from domestic society, he linked
it to property and commerce. The main end of government "is the
preservation of their property".5 Property arose out of labor before
the existence of civil society, but it was only with the formation of
civil society that
the several communities ... by laws regulated the properties
of the private men of their society, and so, by compact and
agreement, settled the property which labour and industry
began.6
Thus for Locke civil property, civil society, and civil authority (the
state) were all linked, and distinguished from natural property, society
and power, pre-civil forms which persisted in the domestic realm.
Rousseau likewise opposed "the state of nature to the civil
state."7 He said that "the oldest of all societies and the only natural
one is that of the family," so that civil society encompassed all social
relations outside of nature, i.e. beyond kinship.8 Rousseau, like
Locke, associated the rise of civil society with property:
The first man who, having fenced off a plot of land, thought
of saying 'This is mine1 and found people simple enough to
believe him was the real founder of civil society... .9
Also like Locke, Rousseau tied together "the origin of society and
laws,"10 so that once again it. was the formation of the state
which created civil society.11
A crucial feature of Locke's analysis is that he locates
labor relations within the realm of patriarchal households. The
labor and gender subordination of servants and women are linked to
paternal authority and expressed in the idioms of kinship, while
being distinguished from relationships of contract and commerce,
governed by law, which with the state constitute civil society.
The nineteenth century conceptual shift of labor relations to the
realm of contract, commerce and law mirrored the emergence of
extra-household factory production, This conceptual shift and the
practices supporting it formed a key feature of European
encapsulation and diminution of the domestic realm, and al30 of
the emergence of ideas of an autonomous market-based "civil
society" distinct from and opposed to the state.
The Scottish thinker Adam Ferguson, in An Essay on tha Hi st-.ory nf
Civil snniat-.y. differed from Locke and Rousseau when he argued against
the idea of a state of nature. Ferguson saw all forms of society a3
natural (including civil society), since human nature was 3ocial. Like
Locke, but more clearly, he distinguished commerce and property from the
state, once they were established. But just as clearly a3 Locke and
Rousseau, Ferguson included both commerce and state as separate parts of
civil society, which was the political nation:
Without the rivalship of nations, and the practice of war,
civil society would scarely have found an object, or a form.
Mankind might have traded without any formal convention, but
they cannot be safe without a national concert. The
necessity of a public defence, has given rise to many
departments of state, and the intellectual talents of men
have found their busiest scene in wielding their national
forces.12
In other words, jtrade lintheoryi could go on independently of the state,
but such trade would not constitute a civil society. It was the'state
which gave society it3 civility for Ferguson. Full civil society
comprised trade, the state, and intellectual and military activity.
Ferguson also contrasted civil society with a form of society which he
said existed "prior to the establishment of property, and the
distinction of ranks,"13 which he called "savage". He thus defined
civil society as the realm of law, order and power in the state, the
creation and defense of property, and of social inequality. If
Fergusonian ideas of civil society had any relation to democracy, it was
a hostile" One."•'
Of particular relevance for applying ideas of civil society in
Africa is the way Terguson used it to construct a social-evolutionary
hierarchy, of societies. He divided "rude societies" into those of "the
savage, who is not yet acquainted with property [and]... the barbarian,
to whom it is, although not ascertained by laws, a principal object of
care and desire." Both savages and barbarians lived "without any
concerted plan of government, or system of laws," which arose (echoing
Rousseau) .unintentionally out of the creation of property:
He who first said 'I will appropriate this field; I will
.leave it to my heirs;1 did not perceive that he was laying
"the foundations of civil laws and political
. establishments.14
But for Ferguson," unlike Rousseau, these were good things. Ultimately,
for Ferguson,'civil society is the society of law, and thus inextricably
incluaes Xhe .si'ate.15 All of these cases illustrate that down to the
end of. the*'18th century, the idea of civil society, far from opposing
that, pfj state., incorporated and rested on it, in distinction or
opposition to domestic society.
Interestingly, Ferguson's rejection of the contrast between civil
society and a "state of nature" removed domestic relations of kinship
and family from the visibility they had in Locke and Rousseau. Instead,
Ferguson substituted a social-evolutionary typology, distinguishing
savage societies from civil societies, the latter being characterized as
societies in which ordered inequality is based on property and the rule
of law.
*See George W. Stocking, Victorian Anthropology, (New York: Free Press,
1987), esp. pp. 9-45, but also more generally.
Locke, Sarnnrl Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), 7.
3Locke, Smwnrt Treati ss, 42. Locke's purpose in making this opposition
of civil and domestic society and authority was to refute the
patriarchal theory which underwrote claims that kings ruled by natural
authority ordained by God as an extension of the natural power of
fathers over their families, in the aftermath of the English revolution
of 1688.
^Locke, Second Treatise. 47. See also paragraphs 87-89.
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Foundations of Inequality Among- tyenr 34, 44, in Rousseau' Political
Writings, ed. Alan Ritter and Julia Conway Bondanella (New York:
Norton, 1988) .
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